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INTRODUCTION 
Since the mid1990s the “cartel party” approach has become one of the ruling models in the 
comparative politics literature (Katz and Mair 2009). In this influential analysis, the parties’ 
traditional role as intermediaries between society and public institutions have become 
increasingly less relevant, a pattern redressed organizationally through the intensification of 
the relationships with the state, which have assumed increased importance in terms of both 
legitimacy and resources to maintain their position within contemporary democracies. The 
reinforcement of the linkages between parties and the state should be understood in the 
context of an ideational transformation by which parties have gradually come to be seen as 
public service agencies which are part of the state apparatus rather than private institutions 
which act as the agents of social segments (Biezen 2004).  
Yet, notwithstanding the prominence of the approach, it is surprising that the relationships 
between parties and the state have been analyzed rather unsystematically. In this regard, 
the analytical framework proposed by Biezen and Kopecky (2007) allows to assess more 
precisely the dimensions of the party-state symbiosis highlighting important differences in 
the three basic types of linkages between parties and the state: dependence of parties on 
the state; management of parties by the state; control of the state by parties. While recent 
studies of European political parties have produced evidence on the first two types of party-
state linkage (Biezen 2008), the last dimension have thus far been underinvestigated. This is 
probably due to the difficulty of studying the control of the state by parties, with the 
challenges being both conceptual and empirical as the politicization of the state involves 
complex and covert phenomena (Müller 2000). 
Patronage, conceptualized as the power of parties to appoint people in state positions 
(Kopecky and Scherlis 2008), is a valuable indicator for measuring the control of the state by 
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parties. In particular, patronage has been a key resource serving to shore up South 
European party organizations (Ignazi and Ysmal 2008). Processes of party permeation of 
public bodies have been facilitated by the character of South European bureaucracies at the 
inception of party competition. In contrast to other West European democracies, South 
European bureaucracies did not develop into fully consolidated Weberian administrations 
before the transition to democracy (Gunther et al. 2006). Indeed, such weak state structures 
lacked the professional autonomy and legitimacy to resist the encroachment of political 
elites attempting to control the state to entrench their position as the dominant actors of 
democratic processes after authoritarianism (Morlino 1998). Consequently, efforts to 
modernize South European administrations were aborted during the consolidation of 
democracy, generating patterns of extensive politicization “at the top” of higher 
administrative ranks and enduring clientelistic personnel recruitment “at the bottom” of 
public agencies (Sotiropoulos 2004).  
Among South European democracies, Italy has long been characterized by one of the 
highest levels of party colonization of the State in comparative perspective (Muller 2000). As 
pointed out by Cassese (1993), an administrative system lacking an administrative elite 
(well-educated civil servants selected by competitive means sharing an esprit de corps and 
enjoying high social esteem) has resulted from historical development in Italy where public 
administration has been used as a social buffer providing employment to the 
underdeveloped South, eventually reflecting its backwardness. Thus, in Shefter’s terms, the 
Italian administrative system displayed a low level of “bureaucratic autonomy” as civil 
servants had no authority towards the public nor did they benefit from public support. This 
implied that the control over such weak state structures inherited from the fascist regime 
enabled the governing coalitions dominated by the DC to distribute a huge quantity of 
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public resources as selective benefits (Cassese 1993). Both the occupation of top state posts 
in the fragmented mélange of state agencies and companies and the distribution of jobs at 
all levels of government primarily directed at rewarding party supporters and voters have 
been extensively documented by the literature (Golden 2003). The party colonization of the 
state has led to exceptional levels of corruption paving the way to the massive eruption of 
scandals in the early 1990s, eventually generating a dramatic party system breakdown that 
can be regarded as a crisis triggering a rather uncommon transition from a democratic 
regime best defined as a “partitocrazia” (one dominated by political parties) to another 
regime, equally democratic but not fully consolidated (Pasquino 1997).   
Whereas democratic consolidation implied the party colonization of the Italian state, the 
impact of early 1990s’ transition on patronage practices has remained largely unexplored.  
The aim of the paper is not only to shed light on patterns of patronage in Italy after the 
collapse of the old partitocrazia but also to search for explanations by emphasizing the 
influence of institutional legacies and temporality of party system restructuring on the 
trajectory of patronage in Italy.  As revealed by the recent advent in late 2011 of the purely 
“technical” government lead by Mr Monti and composed of non-partisan professionals 
precisely because previous party governments proved unable to devise any reform to 
prevent and counteract the dramatic effects of the global economic downturn, the 
performance in government of the new Italian parties has been far from the expectations 
generated by the earlier crisis of the old partitocrazia. 
As in the 1992 economic crisis, once again the management of the increasing financial 
pressures has been entrusted to a technical government. This means that throughout the 
last two decades (1992-2011) the new Italian political class has been incapable of 
consolidating a durable party government regime. Yet, the Italian transition prompted by 
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the early 1990s crisis seemed to have initiated deep processes of reform at both the party 
and the state level. Concerning the latter, the European pressures for reform greatly 
intensified with the membership of the EMU acting as a powerful external constraint (Dyson 
and Featherstone 1996) that imposed stricter budget obligations for state structures and 
the streamlining of the huge galaxy of state-owned enterprises at the central level. 
Conversely, the decentralization process has reinforced the powers and functions of the 
subnational executives generating significant growth in terms of local public agencies and 
companies (Citroni 2009). With regard to the former, the party system “atomization” that 
followed the old “polarized pluralism”(Sartori 1976) in the period 1992-1994 has given way 
to a peculiar bipolarism marked by the wholesale alternation in government of fragmented 
pre-electoral coalitions which has been stimulated by the adoption of two major electoral 
reforms. However, in a context of democratic malaise characterized by the deep popular 
disaffection towards party organizations party labels failed to stabilize generating an ever-
changing party format (Baldini 2011). Given the weakness of party loyalties, the new Italian 
parties have displayed similarities with parties in new democracies marked as they have 
been by an high level of personalism and dominance from a small centre of power located 
at the intersection of the party in government and the party in central office (Bosco and 
Morlino 2006; Ignazi et al. 2010).  
This research draws on democratization literature which emphasizes the contribution of 
political parties to successful democratic consolidation, and in that context the importance 
of party institutionalization (Gunther and Diamond 2003; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). This 
concept has been firstly applied to political parties by Huntington (1968) who discussed 
institutionalization more broadly as the process by which organizations and procedures 
acquire value and stability. An analogous concept has been proposed by Panebianco (1988) 
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who focused just on parties and defined institutionalization as the way parties organizations 
solidify slowly losing their character as a tool. As pointed out by Levitsky (1998), these two 
accounts share the notion of institutionalization as “value infusion” (Selznick 1957). 
However, when it comes to elaborating the concept, they identified different structural 
dimensions of institutionalization. As noted by Morlino (1998), the disagreement about the 
structural dimensions of institutionalization is due to the multi-dimensional nature of the 
concept riddled as it is with ambiguities and tensions. Drawing on Randall and Svasand 
(2002), who identified a set of core elements of the concept, I understand 
institutionalization as the process by which parties become established in terms both of 
integrated patterns of behavior and of attitudes. This means taking the elements of 
systemness (the increasing scope, density and regularity of the interactions that constitute 
the party as a structure), decisional autonomy from external interference, value infusion 
and party reification in the popular imaginary as the key aspects of the party 
institutionalization process. 
The remainder of this paper will show that patterns of limited change in patronage practices 
have greatly contributed to hindering the institutionalization of the new Italian parties as 
organized actors capable to support effective governmental policy coordination. In doing so, 
the analysis draws on historical institutionalism that now constitutes a well established 
approach in the broader comparative politics literature (Immergut and Anderson 2008) 
while being still largely neglected in contemporary party research. 
The article proceeds as follows. First, I review the comparative research on patronage 
politics in order to sketch three alternative scenarios on the development of political 
appointments in Italy after the collapse of the old party system. Then, I discuss the 
methodology and data used in this study. I next turn to the empirical analysis highlighting 
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the extreme personalization of appointment processes within state institutions that display 
still high levels of politicization. The final section discusses the main findings and formulate 
some elements for a future research agenda. 
 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
Most literature conceives of patronage as a direct and particularistic distribution of public 
resources in exchange for some form of political support (Müller 2000). As such, patronage 
and clientelism are largely synonymous and are used interchangeably to define citizen-
politician linkages through selective material incentives in networks of direct exchange 
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). However, in a subset of the literature there is an important 
distinction between patronage and clientelism (Hicken 2011). Some authors define 
patronage narrowly as the power of political leaders to exchange public sector jobs for 
political support, whereas clientelism includes not only jobs but also other state resources 
which are traded for electoral support (Kopecky and Scherlis 2008). When it is understood in 
terms of political appointments to positions within state institutions, as it is done here, 
patronage may fulfil three different sets of functions. 
First, public jobs as a prominent material incentive for political participation among party 
supporters has been the form of patronage on which scholars of party organization have 
mainly focused. Accordingly, patronage works as a reward by distributing jobs at the bottom 
of the state in order to establish loyal electoral support and sustain the networks of partisan 
activists on the ground. It is in this sense that patronage can be seen as a particularistic 
exchange aimed at establishing modern clienteles (Piattoni 2001).  
Second, appointments can be used to support the political control of administrative bodies, 
acting as a supplementary strategy of executive leadership (Lewis 2008). When viewed as 
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the practice of appointing networks of trusted professionals to positions of authority in the 
state institutions, patronage can be considered as a governmental resource (Ware 1996). 
This argument assumes that governing parties as principals face a natural problem of 
controlling their bureaucratic agents when it comes to policy design, implementation and 
coordination. In line with this argument, patronage is expected to help political principals to 
steer public bureaucracies so as to reach policy outputs closer to their own preferences 
(Dahlstrom 2011).  
However, the precise interpretation of what political appointments of professionals at the 
top of state institutions entail is not as clear-cut (Kopecky and Spirova 2011). Political 
appointments in higher level positions may not be understood in the sense of implementing 
the policies formulated by the government, but rather taking over state institutions and 
manipulating them to the advantage of political actors. More specifically, patronage at the 
top of state institutions may serve a third goal, that is exploitation as a distinct state capture 
strategy that occurs when incumbents extract state resources without rent distribution to 
supporters (Grzymala-Busse 2008). Exploitation does not imply those forms of mass 
mobilization typical of “bureaucratic clientelism” as an extractive strategy that consists of 
the systematic infiltration of the state machine by party devotees and the allocation of 
favours through it so as to secure power and maintain the party’s electoral base (Lyrintzis 
1984). On the contrary, in the context of exploitative regimes incumbents do not take 
advantage of the control of top rank position in order to develop large-scale particularistic 
exchanges, but they focus on the extraction of those state assets needed to fuel parties as 
competing arrangements of personalities rather than mass organizations. 
In addressing the issue of the role of party patronage in contemporary democracies, 
Kopecky and Scherlis (2008) have argued that political appointments are increasingly less 
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aimed to reward party loyalty as they are the means to enhance the governmental control 
over state agencies. According to Kopecky and Scherlis, recent organizational 
transformations among the European political parties suggest that they have become public 
utilities which tend to present themselves to the voters as successful governors and 
competent office-holders (Katz and Mair 2009). It is therefore not surprising that 
contemporary party organizations dominated by the party in public office are interested in 
appointing networks of professionals to reinforce their grip over the process of policy 
implementation and their own strength as agencies of government. The stimulus towards 
the predominance of patronage as governmental control has also been enhanced by the 
fragmentation of contemporary systems of governance. As governance becomes more 
dispersed, parties face an intensified need to rely on patronage as a critical linkage 
mechanism facilitating policy coordination within an internally differentiated government 
apparatus (Bolleyer 2011, Flinders 2012).  
While Kopecky and Scherlis contend that the increasingly standardized conditions in which 
parties compete call for the convergence of patronage patterns, the classic account 
advanced by Shefter (1977) highlights the cross-national variation in the use of patronage 
determined by the temporal order of bureaucratization and the emergence of party 
competition. By emphasizing the path dependent effects on patterns of patronage triggered 
by the sequencing of bureaucratization and democratization, Shefter adopted the logic of 
explanation typical of historical institutionalist analyses of political processes (Pierson 2004, 
Thelen 1999). A more recent research strand has refined the Shefterian account by invoking 
the role of the deficiencies in party system institutionalization as the mechanism that 
reproduce patterns of patronage as reward in those settings where party competition takes 
place prior to the consolidation of bureaucratic autonomy. Analyzing postcommunist 
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democracies, O’Dwyer (2006) has identified the fragmentation and instability of the party 
system as the crucial precondition for the “runaway state building”, that is the patronage-
led expansion of public sector personnel. O’Dwyer suggests that one mechanism for the 
reproduction of the legacy of the past may be the tempo with which party change occurs. 
When the pacing of transformation is rapid, as it happens in underinstitutionalized party 
system, the general uncertainty shortens the time horizons of incumbents, encouraging 
them to substitute patronage for programmatic support in building party organizations.  
I build on these distinctions and hypotheses concerning the role of patronage in 
contemporary democracies to shed light on patterns of patronage in Italy. The peculiar 
historical trajectory of the party system makes Italy an interesting case for testing the 
alternative hypothetical scenarios of patronage politics suggested by literature. As 
mentioned above, the inauguration of the democratic regime in the lack of a consolidated 
autonomous bureaucracy left Italian state structures at the disposal of incumbents who had 
the chance to resort to patterns of bureaucratic clientelism as a viable strategy for political 
mobilization. After decades of systematic party colonization of the state, however, the 
dramatic crisis of the early 1992 – characterized by the exceptional breakdown of the party 
system – revealed how the increased rigidity and accumulated contradictions that arise 
from long-term processes of institutional reproduction of bureaucratic clientelism can build 
up to a tipping point leading to abrupt collapse of party organizations (Warner 1997).  
Drawing on the historical institutional approach, there are three alternative implications of 
the early 1990s crisis for practices of patronage in Italy. In the first hypothetical scenario, 
the crisis may reveal the critical influence of parties’ environment to the point of triggering a 
“critical juncture” in patronage politics, thus enabling the abrupt shift from bureaucratic 
clientelism to patronage as a governmental resource. In this scenario, as hypothesized by 
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Kopecky and Scherlis, the influence of the environment would thus outweigh the relevance 
of the institutional legacies of a weak state, eventually disrupting path-dependent patterns 
of patronage. In the second scenario, as hypothesized by O’Dwyer, the crisis would not 
imply any shift in patterns of patronage as poorly consolidated state structures inherited 
from the old partitocrazia would lack the autonomy to resist capture in the context of a new 
party system characterized by the underinstituzionalization of party organizations. In the 
third scenario, the crisis would induce an incremental change from clientelism to 
exploitation as distinct patterns of state capture. If this were to be the case, the 
transformation of patronage practices would be best highlighted in terms of the catalogue 
of modes of incremental change introduced by Streeck and Thelen (2005) to nuance the 
original historical institutionalist dichotomy between path-dependent stability and abrupt 
radical change. More specifically, the shift from clientelism to exploitation can be regarded 
as a case of “conversion” as the inherited weakness of state structures has been redirected 
from the old mass mobilization to the new reproduction of party elites.  
On the one hand, the third scenario can be distinguished from the first one on the basis of 
the sequencing effect which is related to the inherited low professionalism of bureaucracy 
as an incentive for new party elites to develop state capture strategies. On the other hand, 
the third scenario differs from the second one as it reflects the relevance of the timing 
effect which is related to contextual features typical of the postmodern age in which new 
parties emerged in Italy. The timing effects is that the perpetuation of the old patterns of 
patronage is unlikely in a different temporal context of party formation marked by the 
absence of dense party organization and  expanding public employment as conditions 
conducive to bureaucratic clientelism (Grzymala-Busse 2008). When the European pressures 
for reforming and streamlining public administration reduce patronage opportunities on the 
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supply side and the lack of dense organizational networks makes difficult to sustain credible 
rent delivery and monitoring channels, incumbents are more likely to extract resources from 
a weak state for themselves.   
In order to test these alternative scenarios in the subsequent empirical part of this paper, I 
use a dataset produced within a cross-national research project with the help of a new 
method which is presented in the next section. 
 
METHOD 
The data that I use to explore patterns of patronage in Italy comes from an expert survey 
conducted in 15 old and new democracies which represent different types of institutional 
legacies. Most importantly, the countries under investigation also differ in terms of periods 
of party formation and patterns of political competition. Drawing on this cross-national 
survey, thus, the scenarios outlined above can be tested against a wider comparison that 
allows to appreciate the relative position of Italy in relation to the European counterparts.   
The selection of expert interviews as the main source of the information has been 
determined by the amorphousness, latency, and elusiveness of dyadic relationships which 
make the identification of patronage within modern state institutions a very complex affair 
(Landé 1983). Experts interviews may be an appropriate source in the field of comparative 
politics (Rathburn 2008), providing a wealth of insider information that constitute the only 
real research strategy when studying a covert phenomenon such as patronage (Müller 
2000). Furthermore, challenges for the validity of research posed by the use of soft data 
have been addressed in several ways. First, the experts hail from a variety of backgrounds: 
from politicians, senior civil servants and top managers, to academics. Second, surveys were 
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conducted face-to-face by country teams who validated information gathered through 
interviews with alternative primary and secondary sources. Last, the interviews had both 
open- and closed-ended so as to add thicker insights to the categorical assessment.  
Interviews were conducted in 2008-2009 with experts knowledgeable about political 
appointments in nine different policy sectors (media, finance, economy, judiciary, foreign 
affairs, culture and education, military and police, healthcare, regional and local 
government). For each policy sector five respondents were selected using the expertise of 
the country teams complemented by the use of the snowball technique. To obtain more 
detailed information, for each of those nine policy sectors a number of administrative 
bodies were selected and grouped into three different types of institutions: ministries, non-
departmental agencies and commissions, and executing institutions involved in service 
production and provision, such as state-owned companies, hospitals, and schools.  In other 
words, the research strategy is intended to account for the possible variances in levels and 
rationale of patronage across different policy sectors and institutional types.   
Data were gathered and aggregated by following the steps proposed by Kopecky et al. 
(2008). First, experts were asked about the scope of political appointments, that is the level 
of politicization of state institutions along two dimensions: the range of patronage, that is 
how many state institutions parties are capable to reach; the depth of patronage, that is 
how many organizational levels of state institutions are affected by politicization, from the 
top managerial level to the bottom technical and service personnel. On the basis of all the 
answers to these two questions, the median score was calculated for range and depth for 
every policy sector and institutional type. Second, questions dealing with further aspects of 
patronage such as the profile of the actual people who get appointed and the motivations 
behind their nomination within each policy sector were open-ended and reported with 
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simpler statistics at a later stage. Finally, open-ended questions dealing with the 
mechanisms through which parties select people to be appointed and the evolution of 
patterns of patronage over time were only analyzed qualitatively.   
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Levels of Patronage 
I first try to investigate whether the levels of patronage in Italy are higher than in the rest of 
countries included in the cross-national research project. For this purpose I report in Figure 
1 the values of the Index of Patronage which is an aggregate measure combining the survey 
answers on range and depth of political appointments.  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Italy displays one of the highest levels of patronage in comparative perspective with an 
index of 0.47 well above the mean for the sample of countries. This value locates Italy in the 
higher end of the sample which includes also Austria and Greece, long considered patronage 
countries in Europe (Muller 2000). In the face of the data, the Shefter’s hypothesis on the 
association of weak stateness and politicization of the state is therefore confirmed since 
democracies in Northern Europe, where bureaucratization preceded democratization, 
display quite low party appointments within the state institutions. Interestingly, however, 
the current levels of patronage in Italy are lower than in a case of bureaucratic clientelism 
such as Greece with a value of 0.62 which means that parties appoint in most institutions at 
all levels of the administration. The lower index in Italy is owing to the variation across 
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policy sectors and institutional types that emerges clearly if we look at the disaggregated 
data reported in Table 1.  
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
The variation among state institutions along substantive lines suggests that particular 
constrains make some policy sectors partially insulated from politicization. In the case of 
sectors such as Military and Police, Foreign Affairs and Justice, parties are constrained by 
the presence of professional corps which privilege bureaucratic criteria in career paths. 
Instead, the limited patronage practices in the executive domain of Culture and Education 
are arguably attributable to the complexity of formal recruitment procedures that prevent 
higher actual levels of patronage within schools. Experts pointed also to the high 
professional demands on the job in a sector such as Finance and Economy which iare highly 
exposed to international financial institutions. In contrast, the sector which is the most 
patronage-ridden is that of Media because of the high policy salience for parties coupled 
with the absence of particular constraints.  
Differentiation of patronage levels across state institutions can be better identified by 
looking at the table 2 which shows data on the range and depth of political appointments at 
the central level of government. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The high values for the range of patronage across organizational types indicate that political 
appointments are pervasive in central as just a very few state institutions are immune from 
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politicization. As far as depth is concerned, data show that parties are very likely to reach 
into the middle levels of the ministerial bureaucracy. The values for depth within the other 
two organizational types reveal that patronage declines as we move away from the 
ministries, a pattern that contrasts with the previous partitocratic regime characterized by 
the sweeping party colonization of disaggregated bodies (Golden 2003). The lower levels of 
depth in the non-ministerial settings reflect patterns of political appointment that are 
limited to the highest positions in a large number of policy sectors under investigation. 
According to the interviewees, these patterns of lower depth highlight the impact of 
processes of bureaucratic reform that have been initiated since the early 1990s under 
European pressure for reduction of public spending and state assets privatization. The 
process of European integration has thus reduced opportunities for patronage at the 
bottom acting as an external source of constraints for parties whose patronage practices in 
disaggregated state bodies had to adapt to the culture of macroeconomic stability and 
market liberalization institutionalized by membership of the EMU. At the central level, 
however, party elites have not only been constrained by European pressures but they also 
turned out to be less interested in patronage as a resource for building party organizations 
and electoral clienteles. Given the instability of party loyalties, party rulers are discouraged 
from entering into distributive contracts with their supporters since the parties lack the 
capacity to develop the channels of  monitoring and delivery. In a context marked also by 
the relevance of national media campaigns, thus, offering selective benefits to supporters is 
both inefficient and implausible as hypothesized by Grzymala-Busse (2008).  
At the subnational level, however, patronage proliferates as highlighted by the median 
scores of range (1.0) and depth (0.89) calculated on the basis of experts’ answers. Parties 
can reach all the levels of the subnational administration where Europe exerts a less intense 
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pressure for bureaucratic reform and local elites have taken advantage of the opportunities 
offered by the corporatization of disaggregated bodies to fill with party appointees 
organizations created from scratch.  Data show that the scope of particularistic change is 
wider at the local level, especially in Southern Italy, and it encompasses also forms of 
patronage at the bottom as an electoral strategy. As also highlighted by the following 
empirical section, local patronage is managed by notables since contemporary parties are 
marked by the absence of a well-structured organization beyond the personal circles 
gathered around public office holders. This means that notables are not concerned with 
building a large and permanent structure as they are with reinforcing their personal 
clienteles through the distribution of appointments as selective benefits. While the sharp 
decline of patronage at the bottom in central state institutions has implied the demise of 
the party-directed clientelism that characterized the previous regime, clientelism has 
therefore survived at the local level by assuming the traditional forms of the clientelism of 
notables aimed at maintaining personal committees rather than mass organizations.  
 
 
 
The Logic and Mechanics of Patronage 
 As reported in Table 3, while professional qualification is a required appointee 
characteristic in Italy as well as in European democracies, political allegiance is clearly less 
relevant in Italy than in rest of the sample. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
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Interviewees underlined the low party institutionalization as the determinant of such a low 
relevance of political links in comparative perspective. In fact, the fluidity of party loyalties 
proved inimical to the development of partisan relationships of trust between elites and 
appointees as ever-changing  political affiliations could not constitute an important clue 
regarding appointees’ preferences. In contrast, in the rest of European democracies 
characterized by the stability of party loyalties, partisanship provides party elites with the 
assurance that they will obtain responsiveness from appointees.  
The low relevance of political links as a condition for appointment reflects the lack of 
involvement of party organizations in the recruitment process. Since competent and 
trustworthy candidates cannot come from the ranks of unstable parties, the leaders placed 
at the intersection between cabinet and party executive  have become the dominant actor 
in the selection process. It comes thus at no surprise that the decline of parties 
organizations as channel for elites’ recruitment has increased the relevance of personal 
linkages in the appointment process. Given the lack of bonds of trust between political and 
managerial elites built by the party organizations, party leaders rely on their personal 
networks of affinities to penetrate state institutions. Personalization of the Italian patronage 
practices contrasts with patterns exhibited by those parties that emerged as mass 
organizations in old democracies where the elite in government are primarily responsible 
for the allocation of jobs but they are not free from proposal and scrutiny over candidates 
from party organizations in making the appointments.  
In Italy personalized processes of recruitment generally take place in two phases: first, party 
leaders build their personal entourages made of loyal experts from the policy sector of 
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interest; then, it is the single experts of that entourage to explore their own personal 
networks in search of trustworthy managers to whom a position may be given. 
Consequently, policy sectors are managed by a cluster of loosely connected networks, with 
different backgrounds unrelated to party organizations, but which offer responsiveness to 
party leaders. Personalization of appointment processes dominated by the party elites 
holding government offices have also brought noticeable changes to the relationship of local 
notables vis-à-vis national party leaders by reinforcing trends toward a “stratarchical” (Carty 
2004) configuration of Italian parties as party governors at all levels of government enjoy 
mutual autonomy in managing political appointments in order to satisfy their personal 
networks of support.  
Viewed from the perspective of recruitment processes, patronage therefore performs the 
role of the glue that holds together a collection of elite networks recruited from outside the 
party boundaries by mutually autonomous leaders. Not surprisingly, as shown by Table 3, 
party leaders are concerned about appointing at top state positions a network of experts 
characterized by strictly personal loyalty in order to control the functioning of 
administrative institutions. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The prevalence of control over reward as motivations behind patronage reveal that 
O’Dwyer’s argument about runaway state building in new democracies is incomplete. While 
the O’Dwyer’s understanding of patronage suggests that political appointments are 
motivated by the need to build and maintain party organizations by rewarding their 
members and activists, the findings on the motivation of patronage – complemented with 
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the analysis of levels and mechanisms of patronage reported above – show that party elites 
are primarily interested in patronage as a control device not only in Italy but also in the 
other new democracies of the sample which share the legacy of weakly consolidated 
bureaucracies. As highlighted by the extremely high levels of patronage, Greece is the only 
case which exhibits patterns of patronage as proposed by O’Dwyer. However, runaway state 
building has been prompted by the strong governance of well-institutionalized party 
organizations sustained by polarization and statism as distinctive features of the Greek 
system (Pappas 2009), rather than by the weak governance of under-institutionalized 
parties as hypothesized by O’Dwyer. Conversely, control of state institutions is the driving 
force of patronage in those democracies marked by the lower polarization of party 
competition, such as Spain and Portugal (Morlino 1998), or by the formation of parties in a 
context of popular disaffection towards parties and ever-increasing European pressure for 
state and economy reform, such as Italy and post-communist democracies (Kopecky and 
Spirova 2011, 918). 
Thus, pace O’Dwyer, Italian party elites manage appointments for controlling public 
institutions in order to cement their own personal linkages with the State rather than 
building organizational linkages with society. Patronage as control regulates the distribution 
of top state positions to loyal experts which is aimed at capturing state resources. Patterns 
of state exploitation emerge if we consider the interpretation of professional qualification 
advanced by the interviewees who highlighted that often this appointee requisite means 
just a minimum level of expertise and proficiency for the job. This implies that parties are 
not primarily interested in appointing the most qualified people so as to enhance their state 
management capacity and reputation as it happens in Northern democracies where party 
elites face autonomous bureaucracies. The trend towards state exploitation is particularly 
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underlined by the interpretations of control provided by the interviewees who emphasized 
the extraction of state resources as the dominant use of patronage. In addition, state 
capture mostly sustains strategies directed at consolidating incumbents’ personal networks 
of support rather than clientelistic strategies of rent distribution. As highlighted by the 
interviewees, the quickly unfolding political change in Italy has inhibited the formation of a 
coalition for bureaucratic autonomy which represents the most relevant constraint on state 
capture in the influential analysis of Shefter. Since political elites had little time for aligning 
and mobilizing such a coalition, they relied on the inherited particularistic circles entrenched 
within weak state structures to insure themselves during the restructuring of the party 
system. The rapid tempo of party transformations has therefore privileged the small elite 
cohorts who held executive positions and were capable of exploiting the state so as to keep 
party organizations subordinated to their personal power.   
Notwithstanding the prevalence of control, reward is still a relevant motivation behind 
appointments because parties need to distribute marginal positions at the middle and lower 
levels so as to maintain a minimum level of activism on the ground. In particular, local 
notables have taken advantage of the wider scope of patronage within subnational 
institutions, to reinforce their personal committees as the only structure on the ground 
providing capacity for political mobilization to national leaders. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This article examined what happened to patterns of patronage, conceptualized as political 
appointments within administrative bodies, in Italy after the abrupt party system 
breakdown of the early 1990s. It sought to assess whether contemporary practices of 
patronage have been influenced by the legacy of weakly consolidated bureaucratic 
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structures or whether they have radically departed from the patterns of bureaucratic 
clientelism typical of the old partitocrazia. 
Empirically, the analysis provides support for the third hypothetical scenario outlined in the 
research framework as current practices of patronage support exploitation-oriented forms 
of political control over state agencies aimed at capturing weak administrative structures for 
the convenience of the newly governing elites. With regard to the debate on change in 
Italian politics after the early 1990s crisis, the findings are therefore consistent with the 
research argument that identified patterns of limited change characterized by the influence 
of the institutional legacies which prevented a veritable transition to a new institutional 
order (Bull and Rhodes 2007). The findings also specify the dynamics that have driven 
incremental change forward by evoking the rapid tempo of political change in Italy as the 
key determinant of the gradual “conversion” (Streeck and Thelen 2005) from bureaucratic 
clientelism to state exploitation. In fact, the rapid pacing of change in a floating party system 
deprived of stable loyalties encouraged party elites to maintain the patterns of 
particularistic control over weak bureaucracies inherited from the old regime as the readily 
accessible tool to establish their authority over political processes in the shortest term.  
Thus, state capture has been perpetuated by the interaction of the sequencing effect 
highlighted by Shefter in the traditional account of patronage politics with the tempo effect 
underlined by O’Dwyer in the recent analysis of the intertwining between party building and 
state building across post-communist democracies. However, this interaction has not 
generated the runaway state-building as hypothesized by O’Dwyer whose account 
overlooked the timing effect on patterns of patronage exerted by the broader societal and 
international context in which the Italian transition occurred. On the contrary, the findings 
pointed to the relevance of public spending reduction under pressures from EMU and 
22 
 
popular disaffection towards as contextual features which constrained the parties’ ability to 
access state resources and channel them through credible exchange contracts enforced by 
organizational networks. While Shefter pointed to the relevance of the domestic coalitions 
for bureaucratic autonomy as the major constraint for patronage, the findings reveal that 
international organizations such as the EU have been a powerful source of bureaucratic 
reform since contemporary democracies tend to be under far stronger external scrutiny 
than democracies analysed by Shefter (Kopecky and Spirova 2011). Under these 
international pressures for reform, the old bureaucratic clientelism could not thrive and 
party elites redirected the inherited politicization of weak bureaucracies to state 
exploitation.  
By explicitly specifying how changes in patterns of patronage in Italy have been shaped by 
inherited institutional arrangements (sequencing effect), the pacing of party system 
restructuring (tempo effect), and the context of party formation (timing effect), this article 
reveals the potential for researchers of an historical institutionalist approach that is 
especially sensitive to the role of temporality in politics. Specifically, it calls our attention to 
better address the constituent aspects of temporality and how they constitute and 
differentiate the unfolding of historical trajectories underlying political processes (Grzymala-
Busse 2011).  
The analysis of patterns of patronage grounded in temporality has also major implications 
for our understanding of party development in contemporary democracies as it warns us 
against the use of existing party models affected by the ‘transformation bias’ that has been 
already highlighted by recent research on party politics in new democracies (Biezen 2005; 
Webb and White 2007). According to this strand of research, the cartel party model 
reflecting the transformation of parties which have formed as strong movements of society 
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in early democratizing Western Europe cannot grasp the organizational reality of parties in 
new democracies which have followed a different path of development as they emerged in 
a different period and a different institutional context. Since the same distinction between 
these two paths of development holds for the new Italian parties emerging after the early 
1990s crisis of the democratic regime centered on the party colonization of a weak state 
(Morlino 1998), it is therefore not surprising that the empirical analysis pointed out patterns 
of patronage that differ from their contemporary counterparts in the older democracies 
with respect to the balance of power between the governing elites and the party as 
collective organizations. In fact, the personalized and particularistic nature of political 
appointments in Italy revealed that political personalities make use of patronage for 
reinforcing their own power bases, rather than acting as the leaders of collective agencies to 
entrench organizational networks within the state machinery. 
Further, the congenital differences between patronage functions according to when parties 
emerged lead us to ask about the implications of patronage for party institutionalization in 
late party systems (Randall and Svasand 2002). The first implication is that the sequence 
effect on institutionalization in late party systems cannot be related just to the emergence 
of television as a major campaign vehicle before parties are well entrenched (Mainwaring 
and Zoco 2007). The findings support the claim that historical legacies are another crucial 
variable affecting levels of party institutionalization (Hicken and Martinez-Kuonta 2011). 
More specifically, the analysis highlighted that for a country such as Italy the “shadows from 
the past” are rooted in the weakness of state bureaucracies as a contextual feature that 
makes state capture available to help party elites in building and maintaining their 
personalized networks of support during quickly unfolding party system restructuring 
processes (Perkins 1996). This finding concerns the impact of the state of party politics on 
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the quality of democratic governance which is not linear as revealed by previous research 
(Croissant and Volkel 2012). In fact, this research pointed out the role of low 
professionalization of state bureaucracies as an intervening factor which greatly intensifies 
the shortcomings of the party system. 
Further, the findings reveal the complementarity between the institutional effect of party 
system configuration and the temporality effects of party formation in searching for an 
explanation of the opportunity costs of patronage for party institutionalization. Warner 
(1997) suggested that patronage has determined the abrupt de-institutionalization of the 
old Italian parties which emerged in a polarized competitive system by locking-in their mass 
organizations through patterns of bureaucratic clientelism to the point of making them 
incapable to adapt to environmental changes. The analysis reported here instead highlights 
that patronage has locked-in the under-institutionalization of new Italian parties emerged in 
a fluid competitive system by sustaining the state exploitation from newly governing elites, 
thus preventing the consolidation of that kind of organizational cohesion displayed by 
institutionalized parties in consolidated democracies (Bolleyer 2011).  
Thus, patronage has proved to be a resilient barrier that contributed to obstructing the 
coherent consolidation of a new democratic regime in Italy. The empirical analysis therefore 
highlights the changing role of patronage for democratic consolidation in Italy. Morlino 
(1998) stressed the role of patronage as an anchor facilitating consolidation in the face of 
the gap in legitimacy resulting from the pattern of exclusive consolidation of post-war Italy 
but in the recent context – marked by the disappearance of the legitimacy gap – practices of 
patronage increase the inefficiency of the administrative system, eventually losing any 
integrative character by heightening the widespread dissatisfaction towards unresponsive 
institutions.   
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However, by highlighting the role of temporality in a process of democratic crisis and 
transition marked by intense party system restructuring, this article suggests the need for 
more work on the role of institutional legacies in the experience of party institutionalization 
and democratic consolidation. In fact, empirical evidence that supports the arguments 
advanced here remains limited to the Italian case and more comparative research needs to 
be done on the issues of party institutionalization and democratic consolidation. 
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FIGURE 1. EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES, INDEX OF PATRONAGE 
 
 
TABLE 1. Italy, Index of Patronage: Policy Sectors and Institutional Types 
Policy Sector Ministries NonDepartmental 
Bodies 
Executing 
Institutions 
Policy Area 
Total 
ECONOMY 0,67 0,33 0,33 0,44 
FINANCE 0,67 0,22 0,22 0,37 
JUDICIARY 0,67 0,33 0,11 0,37 
MEDIA 0,67 0,33 1,00 0,67 
MILITARY & POLICE 0,33 0,33 0,11 0,26 
HEALTHCARE 0,67 0,33 0,33 0,44 
CULTURE & EDUCATION 0,67 0,33 0,22 0,41 
FOREIGN SERVICES 0,67 NA 0,11 0,39 
SUBNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION 0,67 1,00 1,00 0,89 
Total 0,63 0,40 0,38 0,47 
 
 
 
TABLE 2. Italy, Range and Depth of Patronage: Institutional Types 
 
 Ministries NonDepartmental 
Public Bodies 
Executing 
Agencies 
Total 
RANGE 0.94 0.95 0.67 0.85 
DEPTH 0.67 0.33 0.42 0.48 
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TABLE 3. European Democracies: Qualification of Appointees (%) 
 
Country Professionalism Political  
Link 
Personal 
Allegiance 
Other 
GREECE 98 100 64 33 
AUSTRIA 96 100 89 00 
ITALY 93 22 84 00 
GERMANY 95 93 73 12 
HUNGARY 75 93 43 00 
BULGARIA 59 90 58 15 
SPAIN 93 82 47 00 
CZECH REP. 80 88 63 00 
IRELAND 88 73 71 33 
PORTUGAL 85 77 78 00 
NORWAY 100 52 24 69 
ICELAND 80 59 21 05 
DENMARK 100 24 00 63 
NETHERLANDS 96 64 38 00 
UK 84 24 16 27 
EUROPEAN MEAN 88,10 69,40 51,30 17,10 
 
 
TABLE 4. European Democracies: Motivations of Patronage (%) 
 
Country Control Reward Both Control 
and Reward 
Other 
GREECE 24 18 58 00 
AUSTRIA 75 00 18 07 
ITALY 38 00 62 00 
GERMANY 47 00 50 03 
HUNGARY 50 03 47 00 
BULGARIA 39 12 39 00 
SPAIN 40 04 51 05 
CZECH REP. 66 10 24 00 
IRELAND 04 25 50 21 
PORTUGAL 29 07 51 12 
NORWAY 73 00 22 05 
ICELAND 34 16 50 00 
DENMARK 24 00 00 76 
NETHERLANDS 31 03 43 18 
UK 88 00 07 05 
EUROPEAN MEAN 44.2 06.9 38.1 10.8 
 
